This paper provides an overview of verbal markers of evidentiality in Early Modern German (1650-1800) in light of Boye's propositional scope hypothesis. The markers under investigation include the semi-auxiliary scheinen 'to shine, appear, seem' and the perception verbs sehen 'see' and hören 'hear.' It is shown that, although Boye's hypothesis sheds new light on and calls into question previous diachronic accounts of scheinen, it appears not to fully account for why cases where perception verbs do not scope over propositions are also found with evidential readings in light of the larger discourse context. It will be shown that Boye's hypothesis is still feasible when such contexts are taken into account. Data are drawn from the German Manchester Corpus (GerManC), a representative multi-register corpus of Early Modern German from 1650 to 1800.
Introduction
The current study is an investigation of evidential markers -items that encode the evidence speakers or writers have for the statements they make -in Early Modern German (1650-1800), with a focus on examining diachronic data in light of Boye's (2010a Boye's ( , 2010b Boye's ( , 2012 hypothesis that evidential markers have scope over propositions but not states-of-affairs. There is little agreement among typologists as to how to delineate the category of evidentiality. Some argue that evidentiality should be solely a grammatical category (Aikhenvald 2004) , while others admit a broad range of grammatical and lexical markers into the category (Chafe 1986 ). The most recent contribution to this discussion is Boye (2012) , who argues that the key to understanding evidentiality is not a matter of grammar vs. lexicon, but rather whether an alleged evidential marker has scope over a proposition. This notion has yet to be examined in the light of diachronic data. So even historical studies of evidentiality in German (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010) do not always approach evidentiality with the same criteria of analyzing evidential constructions. The current study will examine a range of previously studied grammatical(ized) and lexical(ized) markers of evidential meaning in view of Boye's claims, showing how previous accounts of these markers are sometimes too narrow in their approach, while also demonstrating how Boye's model does not account fully for the broader discourse context in which evidential items occur, but nevertheless serves as a useful analytic tool when taking this context into consideration. The markers under investigation are scheinen 'to shine, seem' (Diewald & Smirnova 2010 ) and the perception verbs sehen 'to see' and hören 'to hear' (Whitt 2010) . Data are drawn from the German Manchester Corpus (or GerManC), a corpus of Early Modern German from 1650 to 1800 Scheible et al. 2012) .
1 This corpus provides a broad sampling of texts from a number of different registers, allowing the possibility of register variation to be considered. Previous diachronically-oriented studies on evidentiality in German did not have the GerManC Corpus at their disposal, and the current investigation is the first to exploit this resource to these ends. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are a pivotal time in the history of German, as this is when the Modern Standard language comes into its own as a fully-fledged Kultursprache 'cultural language' through the acceptance and codification of certain norms throughout the German-speaking realm (Roelcke 1998, 813; Elspaß 2008, 4-6; von Polenz 2013, 1-2) , as well as a period when grammaticalization is particularly active in the verbal system (Diewald & Smirnova 2010 ).
Evidentiality in German
Evidentiality is a deictic process where speakers indicate the source of information for making a claim: evidential utterances "typically include indicators pointing directly to particular sources or away from potential sources, as the speaker takes a particular point of view in describing an action" (Joseph 2003, 308) . In a sentence such as Ich habe gehört, dass Diana den Zug verpasst hat 'I heard that Diana missed the train,' for example, the speaker points to hearsay as her source of information for the proposition Diana hat den Zug verpasst 'Diana missed the train.' Both Anderson (1986) and Willett (1988) constitute early studies seeking to explain how such a process can be realized in a range of languages. Anderson (1986, 274-275) made an early attempt to explicate what a "prototypical" evidential marker looks like: (a) it shows the "justification" the speaker has for a "factual claim"; (b) it is not the main predication of the clause, but is rather a "specification added to a claim about something else" (emphasis Anderson's) ; (c) the indication of evidence is part of the primary meaning rather than a pragmatic inference; and (d) morphologically, evidentials can be either free syntactic elements, inflections, or clitics (but not compounds or derivations). Anderson's criteria have not gone unquestioned, especially concerning the nature of grammatical marking and evidential meaning not being part of the primary meaning (Aikhenvald 2003; Boye & Harder 2009) . Looking back at three decades of evidentiality studies, Boye (2010a, 290-291; 2012, 185-187) has noted that beyond the general consensus that evidentiality is the marking of speaker evidence, there is little agreement as to whether what is meant by "evidential" is evidence for propositions, claims, assertions, statements, actions, speech acts, or states-ofaffairs. Boye (2010a Boye ( , 2010b Boye ( , 2012 ) thus proposes a framework in which evidential markers have scope over propositions, not states-of-affairs.
To illustrate how Boye distinguishes between propositions and statesof-affairs, consider (1) and (2) (taken from Boye 2010a, 293 and Boye 2012, 192) :
(1) a. I saw him write a letter.
b. I heard him yell.
(2) a. I saw that he was writing a letter.
b. I heard that he was yelling.
According to Boye, the accusative and infinitive constructions (also known as accusativus-cum-infinitivo, or AcI, constructions) in (1) denote states-ofaffairs, while the complement clauses in (2) contain propositions. The difference, Boye argues, is that states-of-affairs can be "said to occur" and do not have a truth value (Boye 2012, 193) ; they do not "stipulate the existence of an extra-linguistic referent" (Boye 2010b, 415) . They can be thought of as "actions" occurring at a specific point in time (Boye 2010a, 293) . Propositions, on the other hand, represent "pieces of knowledge" that have been acquired and contain a truth value. Unlike states-of-affairs, they do code the intention to refer to extra-linguistic referents. They can be thought of as "facts" that are either true or not true (Boye 2010a, 293; cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 144, 166) . Consequently, they can be subject to epistemic qualification, whereas states-of-affairs cannot (contrast I heard that he was probably yelling vs. ?I heard him probably yell, for example). So in (1), what is perceivedwriting a letter and yelling -is inexorably tied in with the concurrent perceptive act and does not constitute a separate "piece of knowledge" or "fact" resulting from the perception; that this perception provides justification for the assertion of writing in (1a) and yelling in (1b) is implied but it is not expressed (Boye 2012, 213; cf. Anderson's 1986 view that pragmatic inference does not constitute a part of evidentiality). In (2), on the other hand, the delineation between the acquisition of knowledge (indicated by the perception verb in the matrix clause) and "pieces of knowledge" or "facts" acquired is made explicit by the complement clauses, the contents of which do have a truth value and which stipulate that someone was writing a letter or yelling (see Boye 2010b for a much fuller discussion of the ontological differences between states-of-affairs and propositions). Given this criterion, Boye (2012, 183ff.) concludes that scope over propositions is of primary importance, not whether something is grammatical or lexical. This is a radical departure within evidentiality studies, most notably from Aikhenvald (2004) , who argues that evidentiality is solely a grammatical phenomenon. Even Diewald and Smirnova (2010) , who adopt a less stringent position for German (which lacks inflectional evidential marking), maintain the distinction between grammaticalized constructions and more lexical "evidential strategies," i.e., items which are not grammaticalized but which often signal evidential meaning (such as certain uses of perception verbs) (40ff.). Leiss (2011) also maintains a distinction between grammatical and lexical evidential markers in Germanepistemic modal verbs versus adverbs, for example -given the more complicated deictic operations involved with the former.
Even though German does not encode expressions of speaker evidence in verbal morphology, recent studies (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010) have shown it has developed both lexical and more grammaticalized means of signifying evidential meaning. The perception verbs sehen and hören are an example of lexical means of expressing speaker evidence (what Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 45) would call "stereotypical constructions," evidential strategies involving the repeated use of certain lexical constructions or collocations). On the other hand, the semi-auxiliary scheinen is an example of a more grammaticalized realizations of evidentiality because it has evolved from the more concrete, lexical sense of 'to shine.' This distinction is -to some extent -rendered irrelevant when determining whether something expresses evidential meaning or not in Boye's framework.
In the typological literature on evidentiality, a two-way distinction is often drawn between direct and indirect evidence (Palmer 1986; Willett 1988; Lazard 2001; Plungian 2001) . Direct evidence is acquired through first-hand perceptual experience, whereas indirect evidence can be further subdivided into inference and mediated information, that is, information received from someone else. In (3) the perception verb sehen is a marker of direct perceptual evidence. Scheinen in (4) functions as a marker of inferential evidentiality, and in (5) In (3), the speaker indicates he has first-hand visual evidence for the proposition that Malgen is ascending with a glass of water. In (4), on the other hand, there is an inference (no doubt based on observable facts) that someone has inherited a disease from his mother. And in (5) the source of information about the earnings of new customs duties is marked as hearsay.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 the structure of the GerManC Corpus is discussed. Section 4 provides in-depth accounts of 2 Data from the GerManC corpus are cited using the file name and basic bibliographic information. In (3), for example, the file name contains information on the register (NARR = Narrative), the period (P3 = 1750-1800), the region of origin (OMD = Ostmitteldeutsch 'East Central German'), year of publication (1774), and some bibliographical elements of author, title, and publication location. See Section 3 for a full description of the corpus structure.
scheinen, sehen, and hören, comparing the results of previous studies with Boye's propositional scope hypothesis. Throughout the discussion, the possibility of register-specific uses of evidential markers during the Early Modern Period is kept in mind.
The Data: The GerManC Corpus
Data for the current study are drawn from the German Manchester Corpus (GerManC), a multi-register representative corpus of Early Modern German Scheible et al. 2012) . The corpus covers the years 1650 to 1800 and is subdivided into three sub-periods of 50 years each. Texts are also classified along the lines of the five major dialect regions of Germany.
3 Finally, texts were classified along the lines of print-oriented and orally-oriented registers.
4 Table 1 summarizes the structure of the corpus: Three text extracts of roughly 2,000 words each were taken for each possible period/region/register configuration, e.g. there are three 2,000 word samples of East Central German legal texts dating from 1750-1800. This brings the total word count of the corpus to approximately 720,000 words.
The items under investigation -scheinen, sehen, and hören, -were extracted from the corpus using the WordSmith 6 concordancer (Scott 2012) . All spelling variants and morphological forms were considered and analyzed with reference to the formal criteria established in the literature on what constitutes an evidential value or not (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010) : namely, the syntactic constellation in which these verbs appear often goes hand-in-hand with whether they are evidential markers or not. Boye's framework is then applied to show how scheinen can serve an evidential function in more contexts than previously claimed by Diewald & Smirnova (2010) . Then Boye's hypothesis itself appears brought into question when the discourse context of certain perception verb constructions that Boye does not find evidential nevertheless suggest an evidential reading. Ultimately, however, such uses are shown to be compatible with Boye's notion of propositional scope.
Analysis and Results

Inferential Evidentiality and Grammaticalization: The Case of scheinen
The verb scheinen is one of the main verbal markers of speaker inference in Modern German. In its lexical use as an intransitive main verb it means 'to shine' (as in Das Licht scheint sehr hell 'The light is shining very brightly'), but more often, it means 'to seem, appear.' It is during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that its full range of evidential uses comes into being (Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 254ff.) . A number of different syntactic constellations are involved: a copula, a compound copula with infinitive sein 'to be,' a zu-infinitive other than sein, a complement clause (often introduced by the complementizer dass 'that'), and a parenthetical. Its overall token frequency in the GerManC corpus is 309.
Copulas and the zu-Infinitive Construction
In Diewald and Smirnova's (2010) account of scheinen's evolution into a grammaticalized marker of evidentiality, the copula construction (as seen in (6) and (7)) -which dates back to the Middle High German period (255-257) -is held to be the historical precursor of the zu-Infinitive construction, which first occurred with the verb sein 'to be' ( (8) and (9)) and later took other verbs as infinitival complements ( (10) and (11) In (6) and (7), the indication of some appearance being emanated from the subject is in focus. However, there is a second component present as well which paves the way for evidential meaning, as scheinen in these instances "describes not only a visual effect produced by a subject (like Sonne 'sun' or Mond 'moon') but rather an impression which is caused by the subject referent by means of its visual (or other) appearance" (Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 178-179) . That is, the woman's physical demeanor and behavior is projecting an appearance of fear on the perceiver in (6), while the woman in (7) is projecting an appearance of amazement. As a mere impression is being projected by the grammatical subject and inferential meaning is supposedly absent, Diewald and Smirnova do not consider these to be evidential, and Boye's propositional scope criterion appears to support this, as (6) and (7) only indicate states-ofaffairs (the appearance of fear and amazement) rather than propositions. Even so, the appearance of these copula constructions with scheinen provide a conceptual link between an emanating subject and an observer, one who can draw inferences based on appearances. This is what is then indicated with the zu-Infinitive construction, when a second proposition is made explicit through the use of a verbal infinitive complement introduced by the particle zu (Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 260ff.) . The copula sein 'to be' is supposed to be the first verb to appear in this (compound copula) construction (de Haan 2007, 140; Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 260) , with other verbs quickly following suit. So in (8), for example, scheinen allows the speaker/writer to infer who exactly the objects of the sculpture are, while in (9), the reporter infers from ongoing events in Sweden that revolutionary sentiments are spreading. Rather than being the main (and only) predication indicating a visual appearance, scheinen serves the role of secondary predication in the zu-Infinitive constructions, allowing speakers to express their inferences about whatever is indicated by the zu-Infinitive and its respective complements (cf. Anderson 1986, 274) . Rather than a mere adjectival or nominal complement, scheinen now has scope over an entire proposition and thus is free to serve an evidential function (Boye 2010a) . Through this process, grammaticalization was at work, as the meaning of 'to shine' and general visual appearance became bleached (acquiring the inferential evidential meaning in the process), restrictions on extrapositioning and valency went into effect, while syntactic restrictions on subject selection decreased (for a fuller account, see Diewald 2001, 91-93, and Smirnova 2010, 177-191, 251-268) .
The GerManC data confirm Diewald and Smirnova's (2010, 263ff .) assertion (based on a different data set) that the eighteenth century is when these grammaticalization processes appear to have come into fruition, allowing the use of the evidential zu-Infinitive to increase in frequency and spread rapidly. Figure 1 provides a visualization of the raw counts of zu-Infinitive constructions in each of the three fifty-year periods covered by GerManC: Whereas the period 1650 to 1700 attests only a few instances of evidential zuInfinitive constructions, the next two periods show that this construction's frequency increases proportionally several hundredfold within the eighteenth century. A chi-square test with Yates' correction for continuity reveals these increases to be statistically significant. For the zu-Infinitive construction involving sein, there is only a statistically significant difference for the entire period rather than for each incremental increase (that is, between 1650-1700 and 1750-1800): χ 2 = 6.721, df = 1, p = .009. On the other hand, the zuInfinitive construction involving other verbs shows a statistically significant increase between 1650-1700 and 1700-1750 (χ 2 = 4.922, df = 1, p = .026), and even more so between 1700-1750 and 1750-1800 (χ 2 = 18.615, df = 1, p = <.001). Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 262) speculate that this rapid increase was due to analogical transfer from the werden 'to become' + Infinitive construction (as in Diana wird den Zug verpassen 'Diana is bound to miss the train'), which they claim was also grammaticalizing into an inferential evidentiality marker. 6 Whether this was the casee or not lies beyond the parameters of the current study, but the data do at least confirm the diachronic account put forward by Diewald and Smirnova (2010) . No connection between register and the grammaticalization of the zu-Infinitive could be established.
If one re-examines the copula and zu-Infinitive construction within light of Boye's (2012) notion of propositional scope, even some of the former could be construed as attesting evidential meaning. Although scheinen in (6) and (7) does not appear to take a proposition in its scope, Boye (2012, 250ff.) notes that there are cases of epistemic markers (which include evidential expressions) "coercing" (253) a proposition where one is not overtly expressed: "even when epistemic expressions have less than a propositional construction in their semantic scope, their epistemic meanings are interpreted as having a proposition as their scope. More precisely, whatever is found in the explicit scope of a given epistemic meaning is interpreted as being part of the implicit propositional scope" (253). This coerced proposition must be identifiable in some way, however (254). Given the copula construction's close affinity with the compound copula construction (where an explicit proposition does fall within the scope of scheinen), it may well be possible for propositional coercion to occur in at least some copular constructions, especially where an inference on the part of the speaker is suggested. Let us return to (6) and (7), where the adjectival complements are forchtsam 'afraid' and betroffen 'shocked,' respectively. States of fear and of shock cannot be perceived directly or have visual appearances unto themselves; rather, one can display signs of fear or shock (e.g., facial expressions, flushed looks, mumbled speech) that are symptomatic of these states. An observer can then infer from these signs that the individual is in a state of fear or shock. Such is suggested by the discourse contexts surrounding (6) and (7), for in (6) the writer's inference is based on the fact that his failed attempts to become acquainted with a Fraw Trelong 'Mrs. Trelong' are due to her fear of him, and he points to her incessant refusal to travel to Heidelberg as a sign of this fear. Similarly in (7), the speaker infers that the woman in childbed was in a state of shock because the mermaid's words have proven true (which apparently was not expected). That there is an implicit proposition in both these instances is supported by the fact that these could be turned into compound copula constructions with the addition of zu sein, thus rendering the propositions overt. This still supports Diewald and Smirnova's (2010) claim that the copula construction forms the historical (and conceptual) basis for the evolution of the zu-Infinitive constructions, as these constructions allow simple adjective or nominal states indicated by sein to be inferred, and then eventually any sort of verbal action indicated by verbs other than sein. However, Boye's notion of propositional coercion admits simple copula constructions into German's evidential repertoire as well. In (10), scheinen functions merely to describe the physically perceivable color of the sea, while in (11), scheinen serves to indicate how things appear in contrast with how they actually are. As speaker inference is not involved in either case, evidential meaning is not present. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 183-185) ascribe this use of zu-Infinitive constructions to persistence in grammaticalization, where the more lexical semantics of an item are maintained even after the grammaticalization process has taken place. Regarding the copular construction, (10) contrasts with (6) and (7) not because of any sort of persistence or scope properties (a proposition could be "coerced" [Boye 2012, 253] here as well), but rather because of the semantics of the adjectival complement. Greenness is a physically perceivable quality, whereas conditions of fear and shock must be inferred from observable behavior. In both cases, the wider discourse context is necessary to determine whether evidential meaning is expressed. Quantitatively, the GerManC corpus attests 68 uses of copular scheinen, with 17 (25%) signaling evidential meaning.
Regarding the compound copular constructions with zu sein, 27 out of 60 (45%) instances in GerManC express speaker/writer inference. Finally, 57 of the 80 (71.25%) zu-Infinitive constructions involving other verbs were found to be evidential. Although Diewald and Smirnova (2010) do not admit any copular constructions into the category of evidential markers, these data support their diachronic account of the zu-Infinitive construction developing evidential meaning: the zu-Infinitive construction involving verbs other than sein is a marker of speaker inference more often than when sein is in the infinitive, and in particular more often than any copular uses which may also be markers of speaker inference. 7 By the end of the eighteenth century, scheinen + zu-Infinitive with verbs other than sein has become the preferred marker of speaker inference among this group of related constructions.
Complement Clauses and Parentheticals
There are two other construction types relevant to the function of scheinen as an evidential marker: complement clauses (12) and parentheticals ( (13) and (14)):
(12) dazu ich dann nun vermeine leichter zu gelangen/ weil es scheinet/ daß unsere heurat/ nach dem tode des Königs Amraphel von Elam/ nicht so eiferig bei unserem hofe mehr getrieben wird.
'In addition I suppose it will be easier to succeed because it seems that our wedding is no longer being so fervently planned for at our court since the death of What scheinen seems to express in constructions with complement clauses is the impression which is produced (on some observer) by some entity or situation. The impression may be more or less concrete, and it may be more or less plausible. Every actual interpretation of the evaluative or epistemic status of the represented impression is supported by further contextual devices and does not arise from the verb scheinen alone (179-180).
By "further contextual devices" Diewald and Smirnova are referring to matters such as the tense and mood of the verb in the complement clause, which often occurs in the subjunctive (2010, 180), hence rendering the proposition nonfactual and non-evidential. This is true enough, but it does not account for cases where the verb is in the indicative. A total of 15 of the 55 (27.3%) scheinen complement clauses in GerManC were found to contain verbs in the indicative, and as can be seen (12), one is hard pressed not to see scheinen as scoping over the following propositional content and serving as a secondary predication. In (12), the speaker infers that since the king's death an upcoming wedding is no longer on everyone's minds because very little is actually being said about it. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 259) acknowledge this construction as a "potential" indicator of evidence, but do not actually call it an evidential marker. But as in (10) and (11), "further contextual devices" are required to determine whether a zu-Infinitive construction is used as an evidential, as the following clause immediately contradicts the impression signaled by scheinen. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 183-185) simply write this off as persistence in grammaticalization. Specifically, this means that cases such as (11), in which a mere impression rather than an inference is indicated, older meanings "persist" despite the fact that the scheinen + zu-Infinitive construction has grammaticalized into a marker of speaker inference. This is true enough, but the exception made for such uses is possibly due to their larger agenda of arguing for a coherent grammaticalization scenario involving not only scheinen, but also werden 'to become,' drohen 'to threaten,' and versprechen 'to promise' with infinitive complements as the genesis of a grammatical(ized) paradigm of evidentiality in present-day German. In the process, they do not even acknowledge the possibility of complement constructions potentially serving as "stereotypical constructions" or "evidential strategies" (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) . Example (12) should make clear that, although perhaps not as frequently used as zu-Infinitive constructions, complement clauses with scheinen in the matrix clause do express speaker evidence in some instances, at least insofar as the GerManC data are concerned.
8
Parenthetical uses of scheinen, as seen in (13) and (14), are given very little attention by Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 180, 253) , who view such parentheticals as adverbial because they are not syntactically integrated into the clause and demonstrate notably different distributional properties. Even so, they note these parentheticals' semantic and functional affinity with copular and zu-Infinitive constructions (180). That some parentheticals (especially wietype parentheticals like in (13)) bear a formal resemblance to adverbials is indisputable (d 'Avis 2005, 266-269) , especially in that they can be placed at the front of a clause whereas more prototypical parentheticals, such as (14), cannot be. Haider (2005, 283ff.) , however, points to a key functional difference between true wie-type adverbials and adverbial-like wie-type parentheticals: whereas the former serve merely to modify the nature of the verbal action indicated in the clause, wie-type parentheticals serve a redekommentierende 8 To their credit, Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 253ff .) dispel the long-held belief that scheinen followed by a complement clause dates only from the eighteenth century (see, for example, de Haan 2007) by providing examples of variants of this construction in Old and Middle High German. Indeed, sometimes their glosses betray an evidential reading, even if they do not acknowledge this. For instance, Example 53 (p. 256) is Das schinet uch an uwerm libe wol das ir darumb nit enwißent (Lanc 283, 12, MHDWB) 'It is also obvious from your body that you do not know about it,' where the body language of the interloctor serves as the speaker's evidence for the claim that the former lacks certain knowledge.
'discourse commenting' function.
9
These parentheticals allow the speaker/writer to comment on the (propositional) content of the clause in which they are embedded (cf. Brinton's 2008 discussion of 'comment clauses'). This is the exact function found with the parentheticals involving scheinen: the speaker infers that his actions to abate a woman's anger have been in vain in (13), and in (14), Goethe expresses his frustration with editors in Leipzig fussing over his work and infers that God is hindering his efforts to become an established author. Although the diachronic origins of this construction type remain unclear, both Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 253) , who note such parentheticals first emerged in the Early New High period, and de Haan (2007) suggest these evolved from the the matrix clause of complement clause constructions (cf. Thompson & Mulac 1991) . 10 There are only 9 such parentheticals (8 being wie-type constructions) in the GerManC Corpus.
Summary of scheinen
Scheinen serves the evidential function of marking speaker inference in a number of different constructions, some of which -copulas and complement clauses -were claimed by Diewald and Smirnova (2010) not to be evidential. In all cases, the larger syntactic and discourse context must be consulted to determine whether scheinen is evidential or not. Boye's (2012) notion of propositional coercion allows an implied proposition over which scheinen has scope to be coerced with adjectival and nominal copular complements, hence the close conceptual and diachronic affinity with compound copulas involving zu + sein. This then gave rise to zu-Infinitive constructions involving other verbs, and the GerManC data confirm Diewald and Smirnova's (2010) account 9 Haider's (2005, 283) example of a wie-type adverbial is Es wurde (so), wie sie es wollte, erledigt 'It was completed as she desired,' where the adverbial wie sie es wollte 'as she wanted it' (literal gloss) specifies the manner in which the action was completed. However, in Er wurde, wie gemunkelt wird, bestochen 'He was, as rumor has it, bribed,' the parenthetical in no way modifies the nature of the bribery, but rather allows the speaker to comment on the source of information (a rumor, hearsay) for the proposition Er wurde bestochen 'He was bribed.' 10 Thompson and Mulac's (1991) hypothesis that matrix clauses give rise to epistemic parentheticals (at least in English) has recently been brought into question by Brinton (2008) and López-Couso and Méndez-Naya (2014), who note that epistemic parentheticals can have a variety of diachronic origins, and in the case of English seem, such parentheticals were found to derive from both adverbial and complement constructions. This is also likely with German, although there is not enough data in GerManC to investigate this further. that the frequency of this construction increased significantly during the eighteenth century. The GerManC data reveal clear propositional scope and contextual clues suggestive that at least some complement clause constructions can serve an evidential function as well. Finally, parentheticals involving scheinen were also shown to be evidentials that, although bearing some resemblance to adverbs, have clear formal and functional differences: they scope over an entire proposition rather than merely the verbal predicate, and they serve a discourse commenting function of marking speaker evidence as opposed to modifying the nature of the verbal action.
Lexical Evidentials: The Perception Verbs sehen and hören
I turn now to two perception verbs functioning as evidential markers in Early Modern German: sehen ' to see' and hören 'to hear.' Sehen 'to see' can serve as a marker of direct visual perception as well as speaker inference, and it is the most frequently used of German perception verbs (the total token count in the corpus is 1,502). Hören 'to hear' can mark not only direct auditory perception as evidence, but also hearsay (mediated) evidence. Its overall token frequency is 454, over two-thirds less than the frequency of sehen. Boye's (2010a Boye's ( , 2010b Boye's ( , 2012 propositional scope criterion will be contrasted with the findings of previous studies of perception verbs, namely Whitt (2009 Whitt ( , 2010 . As with scheinen, a number of different complementation patterns are involved in the expression of evidential meaning: complement clauses, wh-complement clauses, parentheticals, direct object (AcI) constructions, and constructions external to the clause for which there is evidence.
Complement Clauses and Parentheticals
Sehen and hören occur in complement clause constructions (see (15) and (16)) with the complementizer dass 'that' sometimes left unexpressed. Both also occur in complement clauses introduced by a wh-complementizer (wie 'how,' wo 'where,' wer 'who,' warum 'why'), as in (17) and (18), and in parentheticals ((19) and (20) 'Because it's not unusual to see how these two animals tolerate one another in the same house, and such an animosity is not natural -as is the animosity between dog and rabbit -but rather supposedly has more to do with begrudging food to one another . . .' As evidentiality concerns the speaker's expression of his or her evidence a proposition, perception verbs such as sehen and hören are generally only evidential when occurring with first-person grammatical subjects (Whitt 2009 (Whitt , 2010 cf. Gisborne & Holmes 2007, 3-4) . However, the third-person impersonal subject man 'one' can often be used in an interpersonal function with a meaning similar to wir 'we' (Eisenberg 1999, 171; Durrell 2011, 113-114) . In the GerManC data, the occurrence of man as subject to sehen and hören was deemed evidential because ultimately it is the speaker or writer who is pointing to the evidence, rather than some other third-person subject. See Whitt (2011 Whitt ( , 2014 for a fuller discussion of singular versus plural first-person subjects with perception verbs.
Menschen erschlug, ein göttliches Verhängnis über diese Personen gewesen sey.
'They had no doubt, as we see from our text, that the murder of those Gallileans and the collapse of that tower, which killed eighteen people, was a divine judgment visited upon these people.' Examples (15) and (16) contain explicit propositions in the complement clause introduced by dass, and the perception verbs in the matrix clause provide the evidence for these propositions (Boye 2010a (Boye , 2010b (Boye , 2012 .; see also discussion of Examples (1) and (2)). However, both sehen in (15) and hören in (16) function as markers of indirect evidence in these types of constructions: the speaker infers (no doubt from visual clues) that her interlocutor is in love in (15), and hearsay in (16) is the basis on which Bodmer reports the publication location of Pope's Dunciade. This ability to mark indirect evidence (based on perceptual cues) is thanks to these verbs' highly polysemous and metaphorical nature both within and without the evidential domain (Viberg 1983; Falkenberg 1989; Matlock 1989; Sweetser 1990, 23ff.; Harm 2000; Whitt 2010 ). Indirect evidence is also indicated by the parentheticals in (19) and (20) , which similar to parenthetical scheinen, allow speakers/writers to comment on the propositional content of the clauses in which they are embedded. In (19), the writer indicates that an inference can be drawn from the Biblical text that the deaths described were a result of divine judgment, while in (20), the fate of the bread carts and moving Bavarian troops are indicated as mediated information. Of course, as was seen in example (3), direct visual evidence without regard to inference can be indicated in these constructions as well. But when perception verbs are used to indicate indirect forms of evidence, complementizer clauses and parentheticals are the main construction types used to do so (Whitt 2009 (Whitt , 2010 . No diachronic trend could be found with either of these constructions, which occur through all periods of the GerManC corpus. A total of 85 evidential dass-complementizer clauses (5.7% of total token count) and 18 evidential parentheticals (1.2%) involving sehen were found, whereas hören attests only 18 complementizer clauses (4% of total token count) and 6 parentheticals (1.3%).
12 Although both are low-frequency phenomena, the complementizer clauses occur much more often. Whether these provide the diachronic origin of the parentheticals -as has been suggested by Thompson and Mulac (1991) and Boye (2012, 212-213) -cannot be assessed with only the current data, as investigations into the earlier stages of German would be necessary.
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Regarding the wh-complementizer clauses in (17) and (18), Whitt (2010, 95-96, 158-160) and Boye (2010b, 405) have argued that these constructions indicate perception of the manner in which something occurred or was done, rather than for the entire proposition itself. So in (17), the author is indicating there is visual evidence available as to the degree to which dogs and cats can get along when living together, while in (18), the speaker indicates that he has directly perceived the manner in which a doctor expresses selfpraise (extremely loud shouting). Whitt (2010, 95-96, 158-160) argues that only perceptual evidence is available for the manner of the events that are indicated, but Boye (p.c.) has pointed out that because these complementizers scope over the entire proposition nonetheless, they can still be considered as evidence for the entire proposition. So in (17), although only the manner of cats and dogs getting along is being highlighted by wie, the actual proposition (diese zwey Thiere vertragen sich wol in einem Hause 'the two animals are getting along in one house') still falls within the scope of the complementizer,
12
Of the 85 complement constructions involving sehen, 41 (48.2%) were considered to be only markers of direct visual perception and not inference. On the other hand, all of the complement constructions involving hören were markers of hearsay and not of direct auditory perception. The trend is similar with parentheticals, where 5 of the 6 (83.3%) hören parentheticals are markers of hearsay, but 14 of the 18 (77.8%) parentheticals with sehen involved direct perception without regard to inference. Timofeeva's (2013, 177ff .) study of hearsay evidentials in the oldest Germanic languages reveals both complementizer and parenthetical constructions with Old English (ge)hieran 'to hear,' bringing this hypothesis into question. and thus there is visual evidence that the proposition holds true. And in (18) , that a certain doctor is making a scene in the market square is indicated earlier in the discourse, and the wie-clause here simply indicates he is praising himself in a very loud fashion. Of course, this auditory perception serves as evidence that the noises are the doctor's self-praises. These evidential whcomplementizer constructions are lower in frequency than dasscomplementizer constructions: there are only 22 cases (1.5%) of sehen and 7 (1.5%) of hören occurring in the matrix clause followed by a whcomplementizer clause in the GerManC Corpus.
Direct Object + Infinitive Constructions
We now turn our attention to cases where perception verbs take a direct object and infinitive as their complements. Although such construction in the Germanic languages are generally treated as evidential (Chafe 1986, 267-268; Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 176-178; Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 47ff.; Whitt 2009 Whitt , 2010 Timofeeva 2013) , Boye (2010a Boye ( , 2010b Boye ( , 2012 has recently argued against such an analysis on the grounds that in such a construction, the perception verb has scope over a state-of-affairs but not a proposition, and therefore it cannot be evidential (a similar argument is implied by Matlock 1989, 216) . Let us consider some AcI constructions from the GerManC corpus:
(21) Ferner so habe ich auch selbst einsmahls eine Magd von einem ObstMarckte gehen sehen welche unterwegens von den eingekaufften Früchten unauffhörlich naschte und die schönsten heraus suchte, biß sie zuletzt, als sie bald an das Haus kam, wo sie hinein gehörete, wenig mehr in ihren Korbe übrig hatte, daß sie also sich gezwungen sahe wieder umzukehren und ander Obst zu kauffen, welches der Lohn vor ihr Naschen war . . .
'Furthermore even I myself once saw a servant girl leaving a fruit market, who, while returning home, unceasingly nibbled on the fruit she had bought, until when she nearly arrived back at the house to which she belonged, she realized she hardly had any fruit left, and thus was forced to return to the fruit market and buy more fruit, which was the price for her nibbling . In the standard analysis of such constructions (as is found, for example, in Whitt 2010, 30-31 et passim) , the perception verb is taken as indicating evidence for the complement containing the accusative object (or the agent of perceived action) and the verbal infinitive. So in (21), the writer has direct visual evidence of a servant girl leaving the fruit market and nibbling on the fruits she just purchased, while in (22), the Queen reports she has heard the prince's praises of Mirina on a number of occasions. Boye (2010a Boye ( , 2010b Boye ( , 2012 has repeatedly argued against such an analysis of these constructions, arguing that AcI constructions do not take propositions in their scope, but only states-of-affairs. The actions described are "objects of perception" and there is not an "acquisition of knowledge" indicated in such constructions (as there is in complementizer constructions), for the action described is allegedly construed as concurrent with the act of perception (Boye 2010b, 396) . Any indication that this perception serves as evidence for what is described comes after the fact, and it is therefore "implied" but not "expressed" (Boye 2012, 213) , cf. Anderson's (1986, 274) ban on a marker whose evidential meaning arises solely by means of inference as being considered a true evidential.
Such an analysis, although conceivable with Boye's decontextualized examples (see (1) and (2)), appears problematic when one considers the broader discourse context of the above examples. In (21), for example, the author is engaging in an extended diatribe against the perceived inherent dishonesty of servant girls and is warning all those who engage such servants to be on guard against thievery and other such moral ills. He first discusses shifty behavior which he has heard servant girls engage in (using a hearsay evidential). Then -to emphasize the reality of the dishonesty found among servant girls -he describes a situation he once witnessed directly, and even adds the reflexive selbst 'myself' to emphasize the fact that the incident at the fruit market was indeed witnessed by him. His direct visual perception of the servant girl's actions thus adds credibility to his account, and the fact that his vision serves as his evidence does not arise by mere implicature. In (22), the Queen indicates she is perplexed by her brother's allegations against Mirina, noting she has heard only praiseworthy things about Mirina (she has direct auditory evidence of Mirina's virtuous character). That she has heard these praises directly adds credibility to her assertion, as does the writer's direct perception of the servant girl's actions in (21). In these contexts, it is difficult to see how the evidence indicated by the perception verbs can be written off as pragmatic implicatures within Boye's framework. Even if there is no proposition aside from the denotation of the perceptual act -as the act of perception is certainly indicated as concurrent with the states-of-affairs being described -the actual utterance itself would occur at least after the initial act of perception begins, so the speaker's knowledge will have already been informed by the perceptual act before this is realized linguistically. In (21), for example, the author will have already witnessed the servant girl's action before he wrote his diatribe. So although the AcI construction does indicate a state-of-affairs in the scope of the perception verb rather than a proposition, the larger discourse contexts surrounding these utterances suggest that the perceptual acts being mentioned serve as explicit indications of evidence for the claims being made, as well as subsequent conclusions based on this perceptual evidence.
